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abstract  
This study aims to expose the ways in which leading officials of the Committee 
of Union and Progress (the CUP) interpreted, internalized, and questioned the 
conditions of their mission in Arab lands during World War I (WWI). It builds on the 
memoirs of Falih Rıfkı, aide-de-camp of Commander-in-Chief Cemal Pasha, and 
Halide Edip, an ardent supporter of the social and educational reforms of the CUP 
government. Both written after the war, these memoirs reflect not only nostalgia 
and regret but also the complicated relationship between Turkish officials and 
Arabs on the eve of their breakup from one another as citizens of the Ottoman State. 
The study also questions the orthodox argument that the Turkist and anti-Arabic 
ideology of the CUP government in general and Cemal Pasha’s wartime crusade 
against Arab nationalists in particular triggered the emergence of Arab nationalism. 
By contemplating the memoirs of CUP members in Arab lands, this study argues 
that Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Pasha, and Halide Edip tried to understand the region and 
its people in order to create a mutual future for Turks and Arabs within the Ottoman 
Empire. 
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Bu makale, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Arap Cephesi’nde görev yapan İttihat 
ve Terakki Cephesi hükümetinin önde gelen sorumlularının, bu görevlerini 
nasıl içselleştirdiklerini, sorguladıklarını ve yorumladıklarını ortaya koymayı 
amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, Falih Rıfkı’nın ve emir eri bulunduğu Başkumandan 
Cemal Paşa’nın ve İTC hükümetinin topluma ve eğitime yönelik reformlarının 
sıkı bir taraftarı olan Halide Edip’in hatıralarına dayanmaktadır. Her biri 
savaştan sonra kaleme alınan bu hatıralar, özlem ve pişmanlık hislerinin yanında, 
birbirlerinden Osmanlı Devleti vatandaşları olarak ayrılmak üzere olan Araplar 
ve Türkler arasındaki çetrefilli ilişkiyi göz önüne sermektedir. Bununla birlikte 
makale, genel olarak İTC idaresinin Türkçü ve Arap karşıtı ideolojisinin ve özelde 
savaş sırasında Cemal Paşa’nın Arap milliyetçiliğine karşı başlattığı mücadelenin, 
Arap milliyetçiliğinin doğuşunda başat rol oynadığına dair geleneksel düşünceyi 
de sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, Arap topraklarında bulunan İTC üyelerinin 
hatıralarına dayanarak, Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Paşa ve Halide Edip’in, Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nda Türkler ve Araplara ait ortak bir gelecek inşa etmek amacıyla 
bölgeyi ve halkını anlamaya gayret ettiklerini ileri sürmektedir.  
anahtar kelimeler: Cemal Paşa, Falih Rıfkı, Halide Edip, İttihat ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti, Arap Milliyetçiliği
son Nefesinde Osmanlıcılık: Birinci 
dünya savaşı’nda arap Vilayetlerinde 
görev yapan Osmanlıların Hatıraları 
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1. ıntroduction
The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) deprived the Ottoman Empire of the 
majority of Rumelia, once the stronghold of the Ottoman holy war against 
the Christian rule, which had given the state its leading position in the 
Muslim world. Following the Tanzimat reforms, the region became even 
more significant in showing the success of Ottoman modernization as 
it had been more developed than any other part of the Empire in terms 
of commerce and agriculture. The loss of Rumelia, or Western Thrace, 
encouraged the warmongers, who claimed that it was only by joining the 
war that the Ottomans could change their ill fortune. Hoping to reclaim 
its losses, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers against Russia, 
England, and France, the leading contenders for Ottoman territories, on 
condition that the first Ottoman offensive should be against British Egypt.1 
While nation-states divided Western Thrace among themselves, “the Arab 
provinces proved to be the last stand of the Ottoman state as a modern multi-
ethnic empire.”2 During the Great War, the Arab region became the object of 
meticulous concerns of the Committee of Union and Progress government 
and witnessed efforts to keep the remaining Ottoman lands intact. CUP 
officials encountered revolts or ‘betrayals’ throughout the Arab lands and 
used violent methods to cope with insurgents. Arab provinces witnessed 
most of these questionable measures, including the Armenian massacre, 
which left their marks in the modern history of the region. Furthermore, 
these were the last phases in which the supranational Ottomanist ideology 
was tested and evaluated as the principal policy of the state, according to 
the state’s new geographical definition. That is to say, in the context of 
wartime measures, the Ottoman administration and its officials regenerated 
the ideological stance of the state, and tried to redefine the new contract 
between the state and its Arab subjects. 
This paper aims to analyze the final ideological agenda adopted by the 
Ottoman elite to keep the remaining part of the state intact by drawing on 
the memoirs of two Turkish intellectuals and the head of the Ottoman army 
1 Sean McMeekin, The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution and the Making of the 
Modern Middle East, 1908-1923 (London: Penguin, 2016), 127.
2 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” The American Historical Review 107, no. 3 
(June 2002): 793. 
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in the region. Both authors were sent from the center to Syria and Lebanon 
as part of the Ottoman military mission, in order to protect them from the 
British forces and to help the Arabs to internalize their re-defined position 
within the reconfigured policy of the state toward its non-Turkish citizens. 
These memoirs belong to Falih Rıfkı, one of the prominent authors later 
in the Republican Era, Cemal Pasha, one of the three leaders of the CUP 
regime, and Halide Edip, the so-called “Jeanne d’Arc of modern Turkey”. 
Assigned to put into practice a very complex and vague ideology, these 
individuals expressed the image of Arabs in the eyes of the central cadre 
of the CUP regime. Although the two intellectuals, Falih Rıfkı and Halide 
Edip, were not organically linked to the regime, they were among those 
who supplied the regime with ideas about the ways in which Ottoman 
modernization had to be implemented. Reflecting the contemporary western 
orientalist view, they considered the life in Arab lands as a direct sign of 
the decadence of the Empire. The Arabs, regardless of their role in the 
current political situation, were identified and represented as the decadent 
half of the Empire. Nevertheless, Falih Rıfkı’s memoirs, for instance, 
reveal a dualist view. While his image of the Arab people fit into orientalist 
conceptions, he confessed the fact that the level of prosperity in the region 
was much higher than in Anatolia. This dualist view, which portrays Arab 
lands as more prosperous than Anatolia but also more decadent, is one of 
the issues that I will try to analyze here.
Both memoirs were produced years after the Ottoman mission in Arab 
lands. Cemal Pasha’s memoirs were published in 1920, as an apology not 
only for his role in the crimes of the CUP regime during the war, but also 
for his military decisions, which failed to defend the Southern front. Halide 
Edip’s memoirs were written for an English audience in order to draw 
their attention to the Muslim cause, which was under great pressure of 
the victorious Western imperialism following WWI. Lastly, Falih Rıfkı’s 
Zeytindağı was written nearly two decades after his first memoirs of the 
war, Ateş ve Güneş, when the author had left behind Ottoman ideals long 
ago.
Although both were written on different concerns for different audiences, 
and even in different languages, these texts provide different views on 
the Arab world and reflect complex and elaborate interpretations of the 
Ottoman intellectuals and CUP members. Cemal Pasha’s military and 
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political explanations, Halide Edip’s observations on of the West’s cultural 
impact on the Arab region, and Falih Rıfkı’s comparisons between the 
social structures in the region and in Anatolia overlap one another, and 
help to construct a multidimensional narrative of the Ottoman mission in 
Arab lands during WWI.   
Moreover, these authors’ representation of the Arab world in their memoirs 
reflects the roles that were assigned by the regime to the Arabs and Turks 
in the Empire after the Balkan Wars. These roles were about to define the 
future of the Turks and the Arabs within the Empire. Both officials believed 
that the two nations would not be able to survive western imperialism and 
the Great War without the help of each other. However, Arabs did not have 
the means to struggle against these powerful Western forces. Accordingly, 
the role of Turks was defined as helping Arab nation to regain its power 
to implement modernization in Arab provinces.3 Makdisi pictures this 
relationship as the evolution of the Empire’s patrimonial responsibility, 
which was developed in the Hamidian regime, into the patrimonial role of 
the Turkish nation led by the CUP regime.4 
Considering the fact that it is impossible to read the history of Arab 
nationalism without referring to late Ottoman history, the arguments on 
the origins of Arab nationalism can be reviewed according to the political 
decisions taken by both the Hamidian and CUP administrations. The impact 
of CUP politics and ideology on the emergence of Arab nationalism has 
been a very critical historiographical question when examining the motives 
behind the Arab revolt and following events in the region. Changing 
political conditions throughout the twentieth century had determined the 
historical approach to the relationship between the late Ottoman Empire 
and its Arabic subjects. Therefore, any further analysis on the relationship 
between Ottoman politics and the emergence of Arab nationalism, whether 
on the micro or the macro level, needs particular consideration of the 
historical background.
There has been a tension between historical research and historical 
accounts of Arabs on their revolt against the Ottoman state. In many cases, 
3 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, transliterated by Behçet Cemal (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996), 
220-30.
4 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” 792-96. 
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historians have helped Arab nations to construct their national identity, 
and to embellish this identity with a national Arab historiography. In these 
accounts, the politics and the identity of the CUP government have been 
used as an excuse for the Arabs cooperating with Western powers against 
a Muslim empire and the caliph. In this sense, the CUP’s so-called Turkish 
identity, its centralistic policies, and its ‘accommodation’ of Zionism have 
been considered as the prominent failures of the government to keep its 
Arab subjects under Ottoman rule.5 
Nevertheless, recent studies have been deconstructing the dominant 
historical approaches by directly questioning its premises about the 
origins of Arab nationalism. In his article on the manifestation of Arab 
discontent with the Ottoman government prior to WWI, Mahmoud Haddad 
states that the Turkification policies that provoked Arab nationalism were 
implemented in the beginning of the reign of Abdulhamid II, when the 
sultan ordered that Turkish must replace Arabic in the new institutions of 
administration and education.6
For Haddad, Arab nationalism took shape “not as a reaction to 
Ottomanism, but as a reaction to the possibility of its disappearance.”7 
Were the CUP leaders in general and Cemal Pasha in particular against 
Ottomanist ideology? Did they replace the supranational foundation of 
Tanzimat ideals, including fair representation in government, with Turkish 
nationalism? Dealing with these questions, this paper owes much to Ernest 
Dawn’s analysis of the identity of CUP members, the quality of their so-
called Turkification policies, and their modernization projects within the 
region. Dawn mentions the error of the historians of the older generation 
in exaggerating Turkish nationalism within the CUP. For him, the CUP 
had members from diverse political affiliations, and the policy of the party 
was mainly pro-Ottoman and modernist. The party’s role in the political 
transformation was in line with Ottomanism and modernism, which had 
5 For instance, see, Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (New York: 
Caravan, 1973). 
6 Mahmoud Haddad, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 202.
7 Ibid., 217.
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emerged as early as the introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in the first 
half of the nineteenth century.8
The memoirs of Cemal Pasha, Falih Rıfkı, and Halide Edip support Dawn’s 
arguments in two ways. First, all of these memoirs expose the stringent 
efforts of the individuals in the CUP cadre to rescue the Empire, which was 
in great peril. In the days of fierce conflict during WWI, all of them managed 
to produce meticulous projects for the future of the empire and faithfully 
performed every single task they had been assigned to. Doubtlessly, these 
memoirs document the efforts of the CUP cadre to keep the Ottoman state 
out of difficulties that could arise from ethnic loyalties. Second, these 
personal accounts display the fact that implementing modern reforms was 
fundamental, not only for these individuals but for the headquarters of the 
CUP and Enver Pasha, who sent these individuals to accomplish specific 
missions, either political or educational. 
The perceptions of these individuals about Arabs reflect a certain official 
and cultural discourse. Their role in Arab provinces needs to be elaborated 
regarding the role of Arabs and Turks in the Empire and their attitudes vis-
à-vis each other. Their personal impressions of the Arabs as well as of the 
everyday life; customs, behaviors, religious zeal, and gender relations in 
Arab lands are considered here for providing critical evidence on the subject. 
It should also be noted that these memoirs helped the Republican discourse 
to generate a discourse on the Arabs and their world, and contributed to 
modern Turks’ ambiguous perceptions of their former compatriots.  
2. strangers in arab lands
Cemal Pasha, the head of the fourth army in Syria, asked Falih Rıfkı, a 
young journalist in a daily newspaper, to join his cause, which was mainly 
to liberate Egypt from the British yoke. During WWI, Falih Rıfkı served as 
aide-de-camp to the Pasha and the chief of the political and administrative 
department in Ottoman army headquarters in Jerusalem. He was responsible 
8 C. Ernest Dawn, “The Origins of Arab Nationalism,” in The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. 
Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 18-20.
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for public relations and popularizing the acts and deeds of Cemal Pasha in 
the region.9
Falih Rıfkı published his memoirs about his service in the Ottoman military 
during the war in November 1918, weeks after the armistice. Ateş ve Güneş 
narrates the military and administrative story of the Ottoman Fourth Army 
under Cemal Pasha during WWI. This first edition in Ottoman-Turkish was 
followed by Zeytindağı, fourteen years later in Latinized Turkish, when the 
idea of an Ottoman nation had already been deemed delusional. Although 
the contents of both versions are identical regarding the criticism against 
military operations and the CUP cadre, the critical tone in the emphasis 
of geography and people in Zeytindağı is more noticeable.10 The boldness 
in the tone of Zeytindağı derived from the didactical responsibility felt by 
the first generation of the republic to explain to younger generations “what 
went wrong” during the final days of the Empire.  
Zeytindağı, named after the hill that hosted the military quarters of 
Cemal Pasha in Jerusalem, is one of the most significant literary works in 
Turkish language on the Ottoman cause in the Arab region during WWI. 
Its significance not only stems from the fact that the book reflects the 
perspectives of an officer from the inner circle, but also from certain literary 
techniques that were used to create a political narrative. The account in 
Zeytindağı is constructed within the sequence of certain events that are 
vital to understand the policies of war against both the British forces and 
the Arab nationalists. Second, it reflects an Ottoman-Turkish writer’s 
feelings about Arabs and their world. Third, written in the heyday of the 
republican ideology, these memoirs are crucial given that they present an 
attempt to construct a witness account of the Ottoman mission, when the 
Ottoman option was still on the table.
In that sense, Falih Rıfkı’s personal portrayal of the region and its people 
generates many discussions and may help us to materialize the recent 
arguments about the origins of modern Turkish perceptions of Arabs, one 
of which was represented by Makdisi on Ottoman and Turkish orientalism. 
9 M. Talha Çiçek, “Myth of the Unionist Triumvirate: the Formation of the CUP Factions 
and their impact in Syria during the Great War,” in Syria in World War I: Politics, 
Economy and Society, ed. M. Talha Çiçek (New York: Routledge, 2015), 23.
10 Funda Selçuk Şirin, “Bir Gazeteci ve Aydın Olarak Falih Rıfkı Atay (1893-1971),” 
Vakanüvis 2, no. 2 (Fall 2017), 260-61.
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Zeytindağı is helpful in distinguishing the perception of the self and the 
other, not prominently in terms of the studies of the encounters between the 
orient and the occident.11 Primarily, it offers an account of the encounters 
between the Arab and Turkish nationalisms, when the Turks were looking 
forward to their finest hour. 
On 1 August 1914, celebrating the agreement between the CUP 
administration and Germany, Falih Rıfkı wrote that the Empire was “facing 
the sun.”12 When he was called to join the Ottoman mission in Jerusalem, 
he immediately departed from Istanbul, fearing not to arrive on time to see 
the re-conquest of Egypt. He thought that Enver Pasha himself entered the 
war on behalf of the Germans, and feared that he would not make it on 
time to see their victory.13 Falih Rıfkı found Cemal Pasha deciding the fate 
of Arab nationalists from Nablus in his office in the military headquarters, 
Jerusalem. Before housing Ottoman officers, the building belonged to 
the Germans. It was on top of one of the hills, called Cebel ez-Zeytun, 
dominating the cityscape. From the office windows, one can see the 
panorama of Palestine, the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and Old Jerusalem:
I am on top of the Zeytindağı, looking at the Dead Sea and the Greek 
Mountains. Far away, there is the whole left shore of the Red Sea, Hejaz 
and Yemen. When I turn my head, the Dome of Kamame is catching my 
eyes. This is Palestine. At the lower part, there are Lebanon and Syria; 
standing on one direction to the Suez Canal, on the other to the Persian 
Gulf; deserts, cities; and upon all, there is our flag. I am an offspring of 
this great empire.14 
These verses of self-importance are rather reflecting the amazement of 
a young Ottoman realizing his spatial disorientedness resulting from his 
national and ideological identity than expressions of national pride. In the 
age of nation-states, most citizens of empires, who traveled to dissimilar 
regions under the same flag have felt the same disorientedness.15 This 
11 Dawn, “The Origins of Arab Nationalism,” 5-7.
12 Falih Rıfkı, “Karanlık Önünde,” Tanin, 1 August 1914.
13 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970), 32-3. 
14 Ibid., 36. 
15 See, Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, “Orientalism ‘alla Turca’: Late 19th / Early 
20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim ‘Outback’,” New Series: Ottoman 
Travels and Travel Accounts from an Earlier Age of Globalization, Die Welt des Islams 
40, no. 2 (July 2000): 139-95. 
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difficulty was not unique to Ottoman individuals; also different groups, 
parties, ethnicities in the Empire tried to interpret their positions and those 
of others in the society or on the map. Multiple identities of an individual, 
as a citizen of an empire, were precipitously becoming complicated and 
volatile. In 1914, after the loss of the Balkans, Falih Rıfkı, a Roumelian 
Turk, made similar comments of disorientedness about Anatolia. In 1914, 
he claimed that the place did not feel intact with diverse languages and 
identities living together.16 The idea of a homeland was already intangible 
for young Ottomans. Therefore, the first reflections of the writer on Arab 
lands echoed his first impressions of Anatolia after the loss of the Balkans, 
the real homeland of most of the CUP cadre. 
The text reflects the perplexity of a young Ottoman as he felt that these were 
the last days of the Empire not because these lands would be surrendered 
to the enemy, but due to the incongruity between the portrait of the Empire 
and its legitimacy. These were the days, when the lands of a country were 
nothing but dots on the map. The Ottoman geography, its Middle Eastern 
section, is depicted as a historical being in Zeytindağı. For the young 
Ottoman who catches the train with enthusiasm in Istanbul, the view from 
the hill in Jerusalem suggests the feeling of the end, the decadence. This is 
the illustration of a moment of awakening.
The legitimacy of Ottoman rule in the region is one of the significant 
issues that were mentioned in Zeytindağı. In the beginning, Falih Rıfkı 
welcomed the idea of a Turkish-Arab Empire. Interestingly enough, he 
argued that Turkish nationalism would contribute to the erosion of Islamic-
Ottoman mentality among the Turkish intelligentsia, and pave the way for a 
federation between Turks and Arabs.17 He believed that “political authority 
can be maintained in the region, which mainly consisted of Muslims.”18  
Falih Rıfkı first went to Jerusalem as a citizen of the country that held the 
holy lands under control. Nevertheless, it seems that later on, he questioned 
whether the Turks ever managed to take part in the history of civilization, 
16 Tanıl Bora, Cereyanlar: Türkiye’de Siyasi İdeolojiler, 4th edition (Istanbul: İletişim, 
2017), 245.
17 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1969), 245.
18 Ozan Kuyumcuoğlu, “Geç Osmanlı’dan Erken Cumhuriyet’e Siyasal Seçkinlerin 
Suriye’ye Bakışı: Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın ve Falih Rıfkı Atay Örnekleri,” Uluslararası 
İlişkiler 16, no. 64 (2019): 112.
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a significant chapter of which had taken place in this region, where Cemal 
Pasha pitched his garrison on. This major question also characterizes the 
writer’s judgment on the general framework of the relationship between 
Turks and the residents of the region, the Arabs, despite the connection of 
the Turks to the land. Moreover, the author announces the end of the idea 
of the Empire. It seems that Turks had always been strangers in Arab lands: 
Naked Jesus was a carpenter’s pupil in Nazareth. However, when he 
passed over Zeytindağı, he himself had his own donkey that he rode. We 
are tenants in Jerusalem. Not only is the Turkish paper (currency) not 
valid farther than Aleppo, but also Turkish and the Turk. As much as 
Florence, Jerusalem was not ours. We stroll like tourists on the streets.19 
‘We’ does not signify the citizens of the Ottoman Empire anymore. It refers 
the Turks that were alienated even from the lands that gave the Ottomans 
their legitimacy to rule the Muslim world four centuries. Falih Rıfkı 
represents the transition of a Turkish intellectual from being a member of 
the Ottoman society into becoming a simple Turk. Nevertheless, this is not 
an idea derived from the nationalism in progress among the Turks at that 
time led by CUP ideologues. It is more like a confession of the historical 
failure of the idea of an Ottoman Empire. The author implies that there had 
never been an Ottoman Empire, at least not as an integral political, social 
or cultural entity. 
The position of Falih Rıfkı in Jerusalem as a tourist represented this failure 
of integrity. Following these first expressions, which were displaying the 
irrelevance of Ottoman rule in the region, the whole mission of Turks in 
WWI on Arab lands was no longer a source of enthusiasm. The memory of 
the day when young Ottoman Falih Rıfkı caught the train in Haydarpaşa 
immediately turned into a tourist expedition in which he suspected the 
validity of an Ottoman nation. This is not an analysis deriving from 
the unstable political environment during WWI. It indicates the doom 
of a greater historical ideology, which he and his comrades submitted 
themselves to glorify without hesitation. The idea of the Empire had failed. 
The Ottoman state represented neither political power nor a pioneer of 
modernization in the region. 
The idea of Ottomanism had already been questioned since the failure of 
19 Atay, Zeytindağı, 36. 
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the Hamidian regime in reinstalling the parliament after it was shut down 
in 1878. Critics of the sultan for his reluctance to proclaim consultative 
and representative institutions were not only the Young Turks. Also, many 
Arab intellectuals, like Rafiq Bey al-‘Azm, mainly binding their arguments 
to religious principles, demanded democracy, meşveret.20 Falih Rıfkı 
points out the failure of constitutional ideals promised by the CUP cadre 
in 1908. Agreeing with the idea of the demise of Ottomanist ideology, he 
further announces the end of its heir, a democratic empire in which every 
member of the society would be represented. For him, the discourse of the 
CUP regime was modernization under Turkish leadership. Conducting the 
reforms, Turks would operate as the signal tower in the new empire: 
We were forcing ourselves without depending on reality but on the 
sense of history. It was obligatory that the whole of Anatolia should be 
reconstructed; cities, towns, houses and farms should be rich; Turks to 
be westernized; and only then should we run over from Aleppo to the Red 
Sea with the population, the technique, and the capital.21  
The failure of the CUP agenda owes much to its bold attempt to change 
the nineteenth century supranational policies of the state in favor of the 
principle of political guidance of an ethnic group, the Turks. There are 
several reasons for the failure of CUP plans in Arab lands. First, it was the 
image of the Turks in the area. Even though many families, which adhered 
to Arab nationalism, were originally Turkish including the famous ‘Azm 
family of Syria. Nothing Turkish was popular in the region. One cannot 
notice the footsteps of Turkish administration even in the urban space. 
Falih Rıfkı admitted: “the most beautiful building of Jerusalem belongs 
to the Germans, the second also belongs to them, the greatest belongs to 
the Russians, all others belong to the English, the French, and to other 
nations.”22 
Even though, Anatolia and Arab lands stand side by side on the map, there 
is no interaction between them. Furthermore, there was a disparity between 
Anatolia and Arab lands. The CUP ideology hoped to modernize the new 
Ottoman mainland, Anatolia, and to spread this achievement to the Arab 
20 Caesar E. Farah, Arabs and Ottomans: A Checkered Relationship (Istanbul: The ISIS 
Press, 2002), 9-19. 
21 Atay, Zeytindağı, 38. 
22 Ibid.
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region. Nevertheless, Arab lands and cities were incomparably richer than 
the ones in Anatolia. The author’s perception of the history of Ottoman 
expansion in the region displays the ways in which the Turks, coming from 
the barren highlands of Anatolia, were amazed when they approached the 
magnificent Arab cities. He states: “When we pass over Anatolia and ring 
the doors of Aleppo, we begin to see the crowds and prosperity. Aleppo 
was a great city, Damascus was a great city, Beirut was a great city and 
Jerusalem was a great city. And all were foreign to us.”23 
Third, the region was unknown to the Ottoman cadre. Ottoman officials 
were strangers and they were ignorant toward Arab lands. They had no clue 
about the political formation in the region, the struggle, and balance between 
the tribes or ethnic groups. Falih Rıfkı regretted that even the westerners; 
the British, the Russians or the Italians had a better understanding about the 
region and its people. For him, “among those British, Russians, Italians and 
the Ottomans, the ones that had the least information and understanding on 
the issues concerning Syria, Palestine, and Hejaz, were the Ottomans who 
were allegedly the possessors of these lands.”24
Moreover, although the CUP cadre believed that the Turks and Arabs, the 
last remaining prominent elements of the Empire especially after the Balkan 
Wars (1912-1913), shared a collective history and religion, Arabs and their 
lands were mysterious to Turks as much as they were to Europeans. Being 
aware of that foreignness, Falih Rıfkı regards the Turkish elite in the region 
as the occupying force, and describes the feeling of exoticism through their 
eyes as for instance when saying, “…women are belly dancing on camels, 
and spears are adorned by furs, the whole African fantasia.”25
Such phantasmagorical depictions are typical devices, through which the 
European orientalist literature constructs the Arab world that makes the 
unintelligible and the exotic ‘other,’ intelligible. They provide Western 
discourse with cultural references according to which the Western world 
constructs itself as superior to its eastern opposite. In Falih Rıfkı’s account, 
literary devices that were dedicated to make the Arab world intelligible 
were used to exaggerate the ontological differences between Turks and 
Arabs. 
23 Ibid., 38-9. 




Nevertheless, the main motive in his depictions is not prominently to display 
the Turks as superior to the Arabs. The main framework in Zeytindağı 
does not represent or configure the Turkish nationalistic approach that was 
produced by the CUP. Therefore, Rıfkı’s memoirs cannot be regarded as 
a source to represent growing nationalistic feelings of the Turks as the 
ultimate reason for the emergence of Arab nationalism. Falih Rıfkı used 
the Orientalistic approach not in order to degrade Arabs and their world 
but to picture the despair in which the Ottoman officials in the region 
found themselves. The Turks in the region were desperate in terms of 
their knowledge about Arabs. The author bemoaned the desolation of the 
Turks in the Arab world given that Europeans were exerting influence on 
the region more and more, for example by introducing Western-oriented 
facilities from education to finance. The relationship between Turks and 
Arabs during WWI was not different from the general outline of that 
growing political and cultural unfamiliarity between the last remaining 
nations of the Ottoman Empire. 
Within this framework, Cemal’s regime in Syria during the war indicated 
not only the military measures that were taken in order to struggle against 
the occupying forces. It also operated as a power mechanism against Arab 
nationalists, who were struggling to convince the native Arabs that Ottoman 
rule was doomed. Until the end of the war, the CUP regime under Cemal 
Pasha tried hard to eliminate objections coming from local Arab leaders. 
The dominant historiographical tendencies have depicted these efforts as 
main motives behind the emergence of Arab nationalism, particularly in 
Syria. Disregarding the terms and impact of opposition within the Arabs, 
Cemal Pasha has been presented as a scapegoat for leaving Arabs no choice 
but to rise against their state. Being ‘a very ambitious and despotic man’, 
the reign of terror at the hands of the Pasha has been regarded as the reason 
of Arab nationalist urges.26 
Falih Rıfkı, in his description of the executions of nationalist Arab leaders in 
Syria, tries to contemplate the main motives of the Pasha. This description 
also needs to be assessed according to the above-mentioned ontological 
resistance that Turks and the CUP regime encountered from Arabs in the 
region. The author opposed the idea that there was a dispute between Cemal 
26 Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, 101-2. 
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Pasha and other members of the CUP triumvirate (Enver and Talat Pashas), 
concerning the former’s policies in the region against Arab nationalists. 
The main and only reason of the disagreement was the fact that Enver 
and Talat wanted the decisions of the military court in the region, which 
were made by Cemal, to be consulted with the ministry of defense in 
Istanbul. Nevertheless, both Falih Rıfkı and Cemal Pasha himself, were 
perplexed about their feelings for those who were executed. Clearly, Falih 
Rıfkı ideologically praises the CUP for being the most ruthless enemy of 
the protagonists of ethnic separation, and simply links the executions led 
by Cemal Pasha to the raison d’être of not only the ruling party but also 
the Ottoman state. Although being ideologically devout to the centralist 
paradigm, Ottoman officials were somehow sympathetic to the Arabs 
who were executed. Falih Rıfkı tries to expose that these executions were 
heartbreaking also for Cemal Pasha as follows:  
A beautiful lady in black garments and her child greeted Cemal Pasha 
as he climbed down the stairs of his mansion in Beirut. The kid threw a 
bouquet of flowers to Pasha’s feet and begged him to forgive his father. 
I saw the commander trying to hide his tears. Because, that woman in 
black, on the way back home, was going to see his beloved husband’s 
dead cold body in the corner of the square.27  
Not only were the Ottoman officials sorry for the executed but they also 
respected these young nationalists. The writer clearly represents those who 
were executed as idealist and brave: “Those who were hanged in Beirut 
were mostly young nationalists. They walked from the dungeon to the 
rope, brave and hardnosed, by chanting the Arab anthem.”28 
The ambivalence between political measures and personal sympathy stems 
firstly from the fact that Falih Rıfkı wrote Zeytindağı in 1930s, when the 
republican cadre announced nationalism as one of the pillars of the regime. 
Needless to say, the intellectual milieu was suitable to discuss the stories of 
ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire apart except Kurds or Armenians 
being anathema to the republican ideology of the time. Therefore, reading 
history retrospectively, the author’s sympathy for Arab nationalists is 
highly understandable. In this sense, although Ottoman officials were 
equally alarmed about nationalist urges among Arab subjects, those 




who were executed, were seen as the victims of these perilous times. 
The Ottoman cadre was still unsure about the seriousness of the Arab 
nationalist movement. They still seem unconvinced about the means of an 
Arab nationalism. Maybe this was due to the belief that they did not expect 
Muslim citizens to yearn for an independent Arab state, and to separate 
themselves from the lands of the caliph. Finally, and most vital for the 
aims of this paper, the imbalance between the measures taken and the 
sympathetic narrative can be evaluated as reflection of the abovementioned 
feeling of unfamiliarity among those, who came from the center to the 
region and encountered a world that was far different from what they had 
expected.
  
3. defending sacred lands  
Cemal Pasha’s Hatırat (memoirs) was published in 1920, immediately 
after the Pasha was sentenced to death in absentia by a special martial 
court in Istanbul, which was under the rule of allied occupation following 
the Ottoman defeat.29 The court held him responsible for the executions of 
Arab nationalist leaders during his rule in the region. First and foremost, 
Hatırat aimed to justify the acts and deeds of Cemal Pasha during the war. 
Although the apologetic character of his memoirs is obvious, many recent 
publications have offered several witness accounts in favor of the Pasha’s 
intentions. 
As opposed to the tyrannical image of the Pasha presented by several 
historians, who have partially linked the rise of Arab nationalism to the 
executions of young Arabs during the Pasha’s tenure in the region, Dotan 
Halevy states that “his actions were guided by a well-thought-out military 
logic, which in turn emanated from a broad perspective of the war’s 
conduct.”30 Talha Çiçek points out the fact that before his service during 
WWI, Cemal Pasha was appointed to Adana and Istanbul as governor to 
restore order after internal crisis in each region, and that he was known as 
29 Eliezer Tauber, “From Young Turks to Modern Turkey: the Story of Hüseyin Aziz 
Akyürek (Aziz Bey), the Last Director of the Ottoman General Security Service,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 1 (2019): 37.
30 Dotan Halevy, “The Rear Side of the Front: Gaza and Its People in World War I,” 
Journal of Levantine Studies 5, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 39.
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“a man of order” around the CUP circles.31 Nazan Maksudyan remarks the 
ways, in which the Pasha reflected his Ottomanist ideas of unity as early as 
during his mission in Adana in 1909.32 Yücel Güçlü calls attention to the 
Pasha’s vision for the future of the Empire as he quotes the pasha’s public 
speech in Adana on August 23, 1909. Similar to his later speech to an Arab 
audience during WWI, he earlier suggested to the victims of ethnic tension 
in Adana to forget the past, as he told them:
Let us now try to recover ourselves and show that we are capable of 
whatsoever waits for us. All eyes are fixed on Adana. We have to be worth 
of this attention. I want that everybody works. I want that all runaway 
victims get under shelter here in a month. We all will work, without any 
distinction, to rebuild Adana to give its former look. I promise, on my 
part, that I will give all my support, and I will do my utmost to help you in 
this task; and for our duty to be accomplished as it should be, I only tell 
you this: gentlemen, be united! I do not want to hear Armenian, Greek, 
Arab, Israelite. You are all brothers; you must help each other.33 
His memoirs include a very detailed report of his reign in the Arab lands. 
They not only intended to defend the Pasha from charges against him on 
the executions of Arab leaders but also to answer the criticisms about his 
responsibility in the defeat against the British. For him, the war was lost 
due to the ‘betrayal’ of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, even though the Pasha 
had taken all the measures for defeating the British on the battleground. 
Sharif Hussein had to be blamed for the decisive victory of colonial powers 
in the region following WWI, as the Pasha was writing down his memoirs. 
According to him: 
Sharif’s betrayal deprived us of this happy result (the victory) and by 
separating two brother Muslim nations, Arab and Turk, from each other; 
it doomed the first to British and French domination and prompted the 
latter to start a desperate struggle against its most cruel enemies.34  
Hatırat was written in order to expose his extensive military and 
administrative effort as the commander in chief in the region. Therefore, it 
31 Çiçek, “Myth of the Unionist Triumvirate,” 15.
32 Nazan Maksudyan, “1909 Adana Olayları Ertesinde Cemal Bey’in Adana Valiliği ve 
Osmanlıcılık İdeali,” Toplumsal Tarih 174, (June 2008), 22-8.
33 Yücel Güçlü, The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909: Cemal Paşa and Beyond 
(Maryland: Hamilton Books, 2018), 304.
34 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, 149. 
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mentions not only military concerns but also the public works in the region. 
Moreover, the Pasha’s impression of Arabs does not seem to be affected 
by the ‘betrayal’ of the Sharif. He frequently praises the Arab nation, and 
clearly notices their loyalty to the Ottoman regime until the end and their 
usefulness to his service. For that reason, Mesut Uyar states that “even the 
ardent separatist nationalists continued to fight for the Ottoman cause.”35 
Cemal Pasha displayed the Canal Campaigns against the British forces in 
Egypt as evidence for the close collaboration between two nations, and 
the Arabs’ loyalty to the Empire and the Caliphate. The solidarity on the 
battlefield augmented the faith in victory among the troops.36 He confirmed 
that the idea of an Arab nationalism was far away at the beginning of 1915, 
the date for the first Canal Campaign. According to the Pasha: “…there 
had been no attempt of desertion or sign of betrayal among the transport 
corps, which were mainly consisting of Syrians and Palestinians.”37 Salim 
Tamari interprets this comradeship as the creation of a new synthesis made 
of Arabs and Turks and acceleration of the process of integration of two 
peoples into a common future.38
After returning from the first expeditionary campaign, Cemal Pasha moved 
his headquarter from the heart of Damascus to the hills of Jerusalem, and 
dedicated himself to the preparations for the second campaign. At the time, 
the main prerequisite for the success of any campaign in the region was the 
support from the main Arab amirs, Sharif Hussein, Amir Ibn Rashid and 
Ibn Suud. Cemal Pasha did not seem to have a problem with the powers of 
Arab amirs in general, and he did not think of their power to be challenging 
his authority. Moreover, in his memoirs, he praised the last two amirs for 
their help to the cause. 
Problems emerged with Sharif Hussein after Cemal Pasha demanded the 
assistance of the Sharif and his sons on the field. Regarding Ottoman 
centralist policies that were intensified under the CUP regime, especially 
35 Mesut Uyar, “Ottoman Arab Officers between Nationalism and Loyalty during the 
First World War,” War in History 20, no. 4 (2013), 541.
36 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, 162-3. 
37 Ibid., 171. 
38 Salim Tamari, “Muhammad Kurd Ali and the Syrian-Palestinian Intelligentsia in 
the Ottoman Campaign against Arab Separatism,” in Syria in World War I: Politics, 
Economy and Society, ed. M. Talha Çiçek (New York: Routledge, 2015), 45.
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during the war, traditional rights and autonomous power of the Sharif of 
Mecca were at stake. Due to technological developments, mostly with 
the construction of the Hejaz Railroad, Sharif Hussein had lost most of 
his traditional administrative role in the region. Moreover, according 
to the new code of provincial administration, Vilayetname of 1913, the 
autonomous administrative status of Hejaz mostly became obsolete.39 After 
the war was announced, the British openly sought an alliance with Hussein 
and his sons, Abdallah and Faisal, promising an ‘independent’ Arab state. 
The terms and objectives of Arab nationalism were established during 
these negotiations between the British and the Sharif.40 Nevertheless, the 
Sharif had to gain popular support. He needed to generate a discourse 
and a language of Arab nationalism to a certain extent, as he was now in 
position of collaborating with the Christian ‘infidels’ against the Muslim 
Caliphate.41 In that sense, the struggle between the Sharif and the Pasha 
was not only based on military issues but also on political propaganda. 
Hatırat per se is part of that struggle. Although it was produced after the 
war and is highly biased as part of Cemal Pasha’s attempt to justify his 
actions, it provided many hints about the outlines of the political struggle 
between the Pasha and the Sharif. 
Hatırat includes a detailed report about the Sharif’s practices in order to 
answer the accusations against the Pasha, who was blamed for causing 
the Arab Revolt as a result of his ruthless administration in the region. 
According to his memoirs, only with the revolt in June 1916, had Cemal 
Pasha realized that he was being fooled by the Sharif for a long time. 
During his negotiations with McMahon, Sharif Hussein hindered the Pasha 
and the central government from getting suspicious about any of his goals. 
While the Sharif was making his final requests to the British in January 
1916, he was hosting Enver and Cemal Pasha in Mecca, flattering them 
precious presents.42 
39 Mary C. Wilson, “The Hashemites, The Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism,” in The 
Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, 
and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 207-11.
40 William Ochsenwald, “Ironic Origins: Arab Nationalism in the Hijaz, 1882-1914,” 
in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad 
Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 189.
41 Wilson, “The Hashemites,” 213.  
42 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, 261. 
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Meanwhile, Cemal Pasha was trying to reply the Sharif’s repeated requests 
of an official recognition of permanency of his family’s rule in Hejaz, and 
a general amnesty for those who were imprisoned by the Pasha for being 
Arab separatists. Cemal Pasha deemed the first request as unnecessary and 
not of primary importance especially in consideration of the ongoing war. 
He also denied the second request due to the great contemporary concerns 
for national security. However, he had never suspected the Sharif’s agenda. 
After the First Canal Campaign, Cemal Pasha busied himself for a while 
with the separatist ideas that proliferated among Syrian and Lebanese 
intellectuals. Arrestment and execution of Arab nationalist leaders in Syria 
were mainly undertaken in April 1916. Several Arab notables were hung 
at the principal squares of Beirut and Damascus or were imprisoned.43 The 
Pasha dismissed the petitions for forgiving the notables. He believed that: 
“Public opinion would accuse a state that forgives traitors and what follows 
is that others attempt treason and the religion and the state would fail.”44
Nevertheless, Arab nationalists in the Syrian Congress, which was 
established after the war, were mostly not in the picture before. Many of 
them were loyal to Ottomanists until the end of WWI.45 For Cemal Pasha, 
these executions should be understandable considering the contemporary 
situation in the region, which was “contaminated by the propaganda of the 
British and the French.” He believed, because of his harsh response to the 
insurgence, colonialist plans were delayed until the end of the war. His 
policies did not rely on fears of an Arab Revolt, rather they were based on 
fears of decentralization at the hands of colonial powers, which he believed 
supported Arab nationalists.46 He was “sure that the reason for not having 
a revolt in Syria until the end of the war, two and a half years after Sharif 
Hussein declared his independence, was because of the executions that 
were carried out in April 1916.”47
Cemal Pasha claimed that he had never been against the idea of Arabs 
speaking their own language and having some rights regarding their 
43 Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, 102. 
44 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, 263. 
45 Dawn, “The Origins of Arab Nationalism,” 15. 
46 M. Talha Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria: Cemal Pasha’s Governorate 
During World War I, 1914-17 (New York: Routledge, 2014), 46.
47 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, 266. 
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domestic affairs.48 His words addressing an audience, which consisted 
of important Arab notables in the region, in the first days of his service, 
represent his political ideas about the relationship between two nations, the 
Turks and the Arabs, during and after World Warn I. For the Pasha, if these 
two nations would be separated from each other, they would be doomed to 
suffer. Cemal Pasha “created a new patriotism, bringing together Turks and 
Arabs.”49 Decorating his ideas with a religious framework, he defended the 
idea that any future conflict between these two major elements of Islamic 
world would cause Islam to be powerless and finally be attacked by the 
infidels. Needless to say, he was after creating the ideological backbone of 
his rule in the region as a CUP official and constituting his excuses for the 
executions. He assured his audience that:
Turkism is not an enemy of Arabism, but its brother, its inseparable 
fellow. Turkish youth desires Arabs to be developed and to have their own 
rights…Do not believe the propaganda of those creatures, who sold their 
souls to the foreigners, who try every trick and conspiracy to invade Arab 
lands.50
Accordingly, during his service in the region, Cemal Pasha had been very 
careful in his relations with prominent Arab notables. He established 
face-to-face contacts with certain local leaders, and avoided interfering in 
their domestic affairs. First, he maintained close relations with Selim al-
Atraché, the Druze leader, to secure his rule from the dissent of Druzes in 
Syria.51 Second, he tried to obtain the support of the Arab ulema and muftis 
of Beirut and Damascus.52 Third, he claimed the support of Arab “opinion 
makers” by arranging an expedition for a group of writers, journalists, 
and religious scholars from the Syrian provinces to visit the Dardanelles 
front in order to convince them to the great competence of the Ottoman 
army.53  For him, the reason behind his failure was his trust for the support 
of the Reformists (Islahiyyun). Their ‘betrayal’ was disclosed by the 
Pasha’s intelligence service, which managed to acquire the correspondence 
48 Ibid., 211.  
49 Tamari, “Muhammad Kurd Ali,” 41.
50 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, 220-1.  
51 Ibid., 226. 
52 Ibid., 234-5.
53 Tamari, “Muhammad Kurd Ali,” 36.
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between party leaders. Victims of the 1916 executions were mainly among 
those who were involved in the party, Hizb al-Markaziyah, the political 
heart of resistance against the centralist policies of the CUP regime in the 
region. 
Cemal Pasha’s Hatırat is not only based on the Pasha’s evaluation of 
the war against the enemy. It not only contains his perspectives on and 
excuses for the Arab Revolt and its victims, but also his allegations against 
Sharif Hussein of Mecca. It exposes the fact that the Ottoman mission 
in WWI was not only composed of the struggle on the battlefield or 
reestablishing national security. Cemal Pasha, the army commander, was 
the main individual responsible for the whole region during one of the 
most troubling periods for the Ottoman state throughout its history. Even 
though the Pasha was completely busy with the Canal Campaign against 
British forces and regarding security issues in the region, he was also very 
ambitious beyond these issues. Being one of the three leaders of the CUP 
regime, Cemal Pasha extended the scope of his activities, much more than 
he was expected. 
Presence of the army required extensive physical arrangements in the 
region in order to fulfill every need at the camps. Nevertheless, not every 
infrastructural development and public work was connected to military 
requirements. Measures taken to sustain the quality of everyday lives 
of the people in the region, like restoring and constructing motor roads 
and railroads, Cemal Pasha’s service in the region brought about an era 
of extensive public improvements in major Arab cities, even though 
the enemy was at the gates. Boulevards, public gardens, city clubs 
were built, what did not only improve the appearances of cities but also 
transformed the character of urban life. Furthermore, in the midst of the 
war, a successful Swiss architect, Max Zürcher, was invited to make plans 
for the improvement of cities and the restoration of buildings.54 Projects 
were prepared for Jerusalem, Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo. Drinking 
water facilities and irrigation systems for agriculture were installed. Even 
a report on the ancient sites of Syria and Palestine was commissioned. 
Moreover, an orphanage was opened for a thousand Armenian children 
who had lost their families during the forced migration of 1915. A school 
for agriculture (Tanail Ziraat Mektebi) was opened in the Beqaa Valley, and 
became famous among the Arabs. Primary schools for girls were opened 
54 Cemal Paşa, Hatırat, 331.  
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in Beirut and Damascus. Finally, Halide Edip was invited to establish a 
college for girls in Beirut, called Dar-ül Nassırat, which seemed to have 
made the Pasha very proud as he learned that some families took their 
children from the American College for Girls in Beirut to register them at 
Dar-ül Nassırat.55  
Considering Hatırat as a document reflecting Cemal Pasha’s endeavor 
to defend him against allegations, the Pasha first divides Arabs into two 
groups, the traitor and the loyal. By doing that, he tried to prove that he 
is not an enemy to the Arab Nation, but to the traitors, who, he was sure, 
collaborated with Western powers. Second, he tried to expose that he had 
taken every measure to protect the locals from the damage of war. Third, 
he expressed how much he had done for modernizing the region despite 
war conditions. In fact, Hatırat exposed how complicated and intensive, 
and not only consisting of military issues, the four-year long mission of the 
Pasha had been. Moreover, the account depicted the extensive effort, the 
caliber of faith and the modern vision of an Ottoman official, even in the 
last days of the Empire. This vision was not limited with daily politics or 
the battlefield. Nonetheless, taking everything into account, it is apparent 
that this CUP officer’s mentality was far from understanding the daily life 
and political objectives of Arabs, similar to most other CUP officers in the 
Arab world, as Falih Rıfkı put it. The imaginary role that Cemal Pasha 
ascribed to Arabs and Turks in the future of the Empire coincided with the 
emergence of Arab Nationalism. Nevertheless, until the very end, many 
Arabs believed in the viability of the Empire. Cemal’s vision still found 
Arab followers even after the collapse of the southern front. Furthermore, 
some Arab officials continued to serve the Turkish cause to prevent allied 
expansion in Anatolia.56 
4. Halide edip’s mission Civilisatrice
At the beginning of the year 1916, Falih Rıfkı brought a letter from Cemal 
Pasha to Halide Edip, inviting her to Syria to re-organize the educational 
55 Ibid., 334; Hasan Kayalı, “Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater 
Syria During World War I,” in The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and 
Fragmentation: Bilãd al-Shãm From the 18th to the 20th Century, ed. Thomas Philipp 
and Birgit Schäbler (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998), 297.  
56 Uyar, “Ottoman Arab Officers,” 542-3.
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facilities in the region. At that time, Edip was already a prominent member 
of a nationalist organization called Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı) writing 
about daily politics and educational matters in the daily Tanin. Furthermore, 
due to her reformist ideas about education, she was given the responsibility 
of reforming girls’ schools in Istanbul. 
In the summer of 1916, Halide Edip left Istanbul for Syria. This was the 
first time for the author, who was in her thirties, to see lands beyond Izmit, 
a city close to the Ottoman capital. Similar to Falih Rıfkı, she also felt 
estranged in space and time as they traveled in the Syrian desert. Inside 
the car, historian Behçet Bey told her “the trail we followed was crossed 
by Moses and Selim the Grim.” Halide Edip stated that she felt nothing as 
she “was utterly disconnected with the past and the future: as (she) was 
as insignificant and as nameless as one single grain of sand among the 
myriads.”57 
She finally met with Cemal Pasha, and together they decided how to start an 
educational reform in Arab provinces. Edip was responsible for educational 
reform as well as for the reorganization of schools in the region.58 In fact, 
an educational reform was already made in the region by mostly Catholic 
French institutions. Cemal Pasha wished to replace the French as “he had 
seen the strong inclination of the Arabs toward the French, based on the 
educational efforts of the French, and he was desirous of copying their 
methods in a less religious and more liberal sense.”59 He wished to reclaim 
the support of Syrians, and cleanse the cultural impact of France in the 
region by appointing Halide Edip to redesign mass education.60 
Cemal Pasha seemed to be aware of the fact that traditional facilities of 
education were unproductive in imposing the modern ideology of the 
Ottoman state. Instead, the traditional approach in education helped widen 
the gap between the state and its citizens to the benefit of French colonialism. 
Modern education was created to inform, organize, and control the citizens 
in contemporary Europe and the Pasha was aware of it. Halide Edip, on 
the other hand, became aware of the situation of the French schools in the 
57 Halide Edip, Memoirs of Halide Edip (London: The Century Co, 1926), 418.
58 Çiçek, “Myth of the Unionist Triumvirate,” 23.
59 Halide Edip, Memoirs, 400.
60 Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria, 184.
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region not as bright as to set an example for modern Ottoman institutions. 
For her, in these schools “the learning was limited and very much used as 
an apparatus of political propaganda for the French.”61 Within two weeks, 
Edip finalized her report concluding:
Beirut, Lebanon, and Damascus should unite and establish one common 
normal school and college. Beirut should be the place for the school. 
Each of these provinces should have a model primary school with six 
grades to prepare students for the college and the normal school. Turkish, 
Arabic, and French should be the three languages taught.62
Halide Edip’s ideas are generally similar to those of Cemal Pasha on the 
ways in which Arabs and Turks establish a unity and an alliance in order to 
survive the fall or demise of the Ottoman Empire. Education was seen as the 
most prominent issue to teach these two nations how to cooperate. Halide 
Edip and Cemal Pasha represented their duty as to help the Arab nation to 
understand the “evil intentions” of Westerners, and to acknowledge that 
Arabs had, geographically and economically, “more common ties and 
interests with the Turks than with the foreigners.”63 Furthermore, the Turks 
would assist the Arabs “to develop a national spirit.”64
During her tenure in Cemal Pasha’s administration, Halide Edip also 
served as the editor and writer of Musavver Çöl, a bimonthly journal, 
which appeared in Beersheba as part of and in order to promote modern 
initiatives taken by Cemal Pasha. Beersheba was a little district, which 
was founded in the beginning of the 20th century in order to ameliorate 
the living conditions of the Bedouin population in the region.65 Similarly, 
Musavver Çöl was part of the civilizing mission aimed to “enlighten” Arabs 
in the desert. Learning about the journal, Yusuf Akçura congratulated the 
publishers as being “among the vanguards of those, who aim to succeed an 
honorary, humanitarian, and therefore sacred mission, which is to civilize 
61 Halide Edip, Memoirs, 401. 
62 Ibid., 402. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria, 186.
65 David Kushner, “The Musavver Çöl: An Ottoman Journal in Beersheba at the End of 
World War I,” in Perspectives on Ottoman Studies: Papers from the 18th Symposium 
of the International Committee of Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Studies (CIEPO), ed. 




the desert.”66 Second, Musavver Çöl aimed “to bring to its readers, both 
Turks and Arabs, the message of the Ottoman leadership and instill in them 
feelings of patriotism and sacrifice at this critical moment in the Empire’s 
history, when it was fighting for its very survival.”67 Musavver Çöl aimed 
to promote a union between Turks and Arabs, and frequently warned its 
readers against the calamities of Western colonialism. Years later, Halide 
Edip evoked many of these ideas in her memoirs assessing the future of 
Arab and Turkish nations and how to fight Western hegemony. 
Her appointment was understandable as she was anxious to fight against 
the cultural and educational hegemony of the West in Beirut and Syria. 
One day she visited the Maronite patriarch in the end of her mission in the 
region. The patriarch was clearly supporting French domination. During 
the meeting, she thought that “once the artificial difference of the Moslem 
and Christian Arab is removed (a feeling nursed and created the most 
by Western powers in the East), all Arabs, including the Maronites, will 
unite.68  
After a long journey, Edip and fifty female teachers in her company 
were able to launch education in the old French college, Der-Nassira 
(Ladies of Nazareth), in Beirut, in January 1917. Other teachers in her 
team were selected from her own pupils, who had modernized the evkaf 
schools in Istanbul under the CUP administration. There were some two 
hundred applicants for a place of twenty in the entrance examinations. 
The applicants were from Lebanon, Beirut, and Damascus. The questions 
were mostly about the Arab geography, its language and culture. Seeing 
the exam questions, the Arab inspector of public instruction, Jasir Efendi, 
told Edip while laughing that if she were an Arab, she would be accused of 
Arab nationalism and sent to the court in Aliye. Halide Edip seemed very 
surprised as she found out that most of the girls, coming mostly from French 
schools, “knew nothing about the country they lived in and despised their 
own language as inferior to French.”69 The education of Arabic became the 
most important mission in the new school. 
66 Gülsüm Polat, “I. Dünya Savaşında İngiliz ve Türk Propaganda Gazetelerinin Etkinliği 
Üzerine bir Değerlendirme (el-Hakika ve Musavver Çöl),” OTAM 36 (Fall 2014), 146.
67 Kushner, “The Musavver Çöl,” 169.
68 Halide Edip, Memoirs, 457.
69 Ibid., 440. 
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Der-Nassira seems to have aroused considerable interest among Arab 
women in the region. An empty desk, especially in sewing and language 
classes, was in high demand. The school was offering Arabic, Turkish, and 
French classes. Moreover, fashionable uniforms were ordered, manifesting 
the modern, secular, and Western character of the college. 
By November 1917, the Ottoman frontline was destroyed by the British 
and only then Halide Edip became concerned about the future of her work 
in the region. Nevertheless, until she was able to talk to Cemal Pasha, she 
had never thought that the region would fall to the British forces. Asked 
by the Pasha if she and her companions wanted to leave for home, she 
responded “…the honor of Turkish women demanded that they should stay 
till they were officially authorized to leave the schools.”70
Only from this moment on Edip started to follow the news from the front. 
Realizing that the situation was worse than she thought, she at least wanted 
to continue education until the last moment when she became unable to 
provide the necessary material conditions for the schools. She received the 
promise from the chief of supplies of taking necessary provisions enough 
for four more months. In February 1918, Edip asked the leading Americans 
in Beirut to take the orphanage under the protection of the Red Cross. On 
the fourth of March, she was able to leave Syria for Istanbul in relief. She 
was not only concerned for the future of the schools that she run in the 
region, but also was in agony regarding the future of her country. By the 
armistice, which was signed in Moudros in October 1918, the Ottoman 
Empire was no more. The government was leaving Arabs alone with their 
fate of falling prey to Western colonialism. As Palestine became a British 
Protectorate, Syria and Lebanon turned into a French Mandate. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Studies on how Arab nationalism proliferated under the CUP government 
have focused on the latter’s growing pan-Turkist inclinations especially 
after the Balkan Wars. The CUP regime has been repeatedly condemned by 
renowned scholars of Arab nationalism for prompting Arab citizens of the 




and Zeine Zeine’s arguments are examples of this narrative. In general, 
they believe that Cemal Pasha’s regime in Arab lands left Arabs no choice 
but to collaborate with European powers in order to protect themselves 
from the calamities that were created by centralist policies of Istanbul. For 
them, executions of Arab nationalists on orders of Cemal Pasha without 
any evident reason, precipitated the separation between Arabs and the 
Ottoman central government. 
In this study, I have analyzed three memoirs that were written by prominent 
Ottoman officials after the war in order to challenge the orthodox argument 
that is based on the responsibility of the CUP cadre for the emergence of 
Arab nationalism. Memoirs of Cemal Pasha, Falih Rıfkı, and Halide Edip 
reveal these officials’ faith in restoring the contract between Arabs and 
the Ottoman center against Western colonialism. Being neither nationalist 
fanatics nor defenders of the status quo, they seem to be convinced of 
the requirements of modern social and everyday life. Although their 
interpretations of the Arabs and the future of the Ottoman rule differ from 
one another, they advocated for reforms in the region even during the 
climax of war.
Written by Falih Rıfkı, a future supporter of the secularist policies of the 
republican regime, which followed the fall of the Ottoman State, Zeytindağı 
gives a general picture of the regime, criticizes both Arabs and Turks for 
the result. It emphasizes the cultural and political boundaries between the 
two nations. Nevertheless, Rıfkı does not refrain from confirming that Arab 
nationalism during the war was not very popular in the region, and there 
was still a great collaboration between Arab and Turkish citizens of the 
Empire. Zeytindağı reflects the republican consideration of the contested 
relationship between Turks and Arabs. However, different from the 
dominant republican narrative that defames Arabs as “traitors”, and holds 
them responsible for the collapse of the Arab front, it denies a general 
conflict between the two people. 
Cemal Pasha, one of the CUP, writes his memoirs to justify his rule over 
the region, which has been considered an era of tyranny by most historians. 
He is also aware of the fact that his regime was not only consisting of 
the struggle on the battlefield against the British. He claims that the 
execution of Arab leaders was necessary because they were traitors both 
to their country and to their own people. He represents these measures as 
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part of his desire to keep Arab lands in peace, even though there was a 
violent war against the infidel going on, very close to the Arab heartland. 
Accordingly, he believes that both Arabs and Turks should collaborate in 
order to maintain the well-being of the Empire, and thus of their nations. 
For him, both nations were dependent on each other in order to survive. To 
expose his and his party’s intentions about the future of the country, and to 
emphasize the crucial position of Arabs in the future of the Empire, Cemal 
Pasha tried to modernize the region and installed many public projects. 
He was hoping to convince Arab elites, who wanted the region to benefit 
from modernity. Written immediately after he was accused of war crimes, 
his memoirs consisted of the Pasha’s defense for each of his actions in the 
region. Many other independent witness accounts of the acts and deeds 
of Cemal Pasha, such as of Muhammad Kurd Ali and Sheik al-Shukairi, 
support his claims.
Halide Edip, a prominent supporter of Turkish independence and the most 
popular female author of her time in Turkey, was responsible for one of the 
most prominent pillars of Cemal Pasha’s modernization attempts, namely 
the education of the Arab children. The aim was to educate Arabs according 
to modern principles, and to inform them about the culture, the history, and 
the language of their own nation. It was believed that as these children 
recognized their affinities with their Turkish co-citizens, they would be 
more loyal to Turks, and to the Empire instead of Western powers. Even 
though, Edip’s memoirs were published to address English readers a 
decade after her tenure in Beirut and Syria, it was far from apologetic. She 
continued to advocate Muslim resistance against the snowballing pressure 
of Western imperialism following WWI, and regretted the lost chance of 
unity between Turks and Arabs.
Historical narratives have suggested that the bond between Arabs and 
Turks weakened during the CUP regime, and finally fell apart under Cemal 
Pasha’s reign in the region. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of these Turkish 
officials while planning the future of how Arabs and the Turks would 
establish their mutual fate, indicates that the relationship between the two 
nations was still intact until the collapse of the Empire. Although there 
were cultural and political boundaries between CUP officials and Arabs 
during WWI, they worked tenaciously with faith in the Ottoman nation, 
which mainly consisted of Turks and Arabs, until the very end of the war. 
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The idea of an Arab nation during the war was still far from challenging the 
popularity of the idea of an Ottoman nation, especially having the Western 
enemy nearby. 
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